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Abstract
This paper develops a framework which analyzes how a population’s culture a¤ects the deci-
sions of rational pro…t maximizing …rms, while simultaneously exploring how the actions of these
…rms in turn a¤ect the population’s culture. By endogenizing culture as well as the more usual
economic variables, it shows how an economically valuable behavioural trait can be sustained
as part of a competitive equilibrium. It is shown that, for given primitives, an economy can
be in either a “good” steady state, in which the valuable cultural trait is present, or a welfare
dominated “bad” one in which the valuable cultural trait disappears. Starting from the “good”
steady state and implementing productivity improvements raises welfare, but if changes are too
rapid this steady state will not be reached from the old one. Instead, the unique trajectory is to
the bad steady state where welfare is reduced.
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1 Introduction
Does culture play a central role in economic development? Many have asserted that it does.
Amongst the most prominent was Max Weber (1905) who argued a critical role was played
by a population’s “work ethic”. He linked it with Calvinist Protestantism, and argued it was
a crucial ingredient in the advent of modern capitalism in Northern Europe. A large body
of work in sociology followed, pursuing cultural explanations for economic and developmental
di¤erences across countries.1 An empirical …eld, psychometrics, based on individual surveys,
aimed to document in a systematic way the cross-country variations in “cultures”; for a review
see Furnham (1990).
Economists, on the other hand, typically proceed by assuming cultural di¤erences away, and
build models to explain development (or underdevelopment) that start from di¤erent building
blocks.2 This has not been to deny the potential importance of culture, but rather has re‡ected
economists’ di¢culty in coming to terms with culture using the standard tools of theory. Cul-
turalist type explanations have been met with some sympathy by development economists: For
example, Ostrom (1990) emphasizes such considerations in explaining why societies can some-
times solve free-rider problems arising from unlimited access to natural resources. The term
“social capital”, used by Putnam (1993) to describe regional di¤erences in Italian civic attitudes,
has found wider use as a term to capture intangible factors such as cooperation, trust and civic
mindedness, that seem helpful to the emergence of modern capitalist production.3
However, what has stopped culture from gaining wider currency amongst the economic pro-
fession has been the lack of models allowing cultural type considerations to be analyzed alongside
more traditional economic concerns. Without such models, culture is inevitably treated as exoge-
nous, and “explanations” thereby arising are not convincing. Merely attributing underdevelop-
1This work has often attempted to explain phenomena which are clearly economic. For example, in the …eld
of development studies, writers have long evoked Weberian work ethics, in a Confucian guise, as an explanatory
variable in successful South East Asian development (see Kunio 1994).
2 Institutions, technology, resource endowments, incentives, etc.
3Landes (1998) argues culture to be a critical factor in explaining cross-country experiences. A broad overview
of related work in this area, which is mainly non-economic, can be found in Harrison and Huntington (2000).
The theme of this work, which is largely by sociologists and cultural anthropologists, is that cultures have critical
determining e¤ects on societies’ economic and institutional development. This literature is rich with examples
of both cultural impediments and aids to development across countries, regions and groups, but is not generally
concerned with the reasons for cultural di¤erence, nor with the direction of causation running from the economic
to the cultural. The present work complements that literature by attempting to understand a mechanism whereby
an economically useful cultural trait can be rewarded and thus reinforced.
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ment to cultural factors, which are treated as exogenous endowments, is more a re-labelling than
an explanation and provides little insight. What seems to be needed is a framework where the
in‡uence of culture on more traditional economic factors such as work, production and business
formation is allowed, but also in which the in‡uence of these economic factors on the population’s
culture can be examined. That is, we need a framework which allows culture to play a role but
which also makes it endogenous. This is what we do here: we allow for a production process that
admits a valuable role for culture, however, our framework also attempts to explain where the
population’s culture comes from.
Speci…cally we assume production is “complex” by which we mean subject to moral hazard
that cannot be contracted away. Thus …rms seek workers who are less likely to exploit opportuni-
ties to shirk. This is where culture comes in. We allow for individuals to di¤er in their propensity
to shirk, a characteristic we term “cooperativeness”. This characteristic is meant to roughly cap-
ture many features sociologists have argued to be important - cooperation, work ethics, or trust.
In our framework, simply, “cooperators” receive relatively little intrinsic bene…t to shirking in
comparison with “non-cooperators”. This is consistent with them having a high work ethic and
thus not minding work. Alternatively, it is also consistent with cooperators valuing keeping their
promises to work, or simply enjoying cooperating. The precise underpinning is immaterial, and
may vary, all that matters is the net dampening e¤ect this has on their propensity to shirk.
We then use a somewhat standard evolutionary dynamic to explain where this culture comes
from. This means that the prevalence of cooperators in a population changes, albeit slowly, in
response to economic rewards. The better cooperators fare, over their life-times, in comparison
to non-cooperators the more prevalent they will eventually be, and vice versa.4
Importantly, the individuals in our framework are not automata; they make rational choices
based on economic returns and their own inherent tendencies. These inherent tendencies re‡ect
the population’s culture, but cooperators may still shirk if economic rewards to cooperating are
too low, and so too non-cooperators may work if the returns are high enough, it is simply that
the margins for these individuals di¤er.
This slowly evolving culture and the actions of pro…t maximizing …rms are highly interrelated
processes. Firms have access to the complex technology and, with the right e¤ort from workers,
4For recent examples of evolutionary approaches to characteristics and preferences see Nyberg (1997), Lindbeck,
Nyberg and Weibull (1998) and Fershtman and Weiss (1998).
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will be more productive than alternative producers who do not require worker cooperation. For
expositional purposes, we interpret this alternative technology as traditional or household level
individual production. The problem for these …rms, however, is that the complexity of these tasks
makes monitoring workers di¢cult and not solvable by contract, so that workers who shirk impose
costs on the …rms. Moreover, a worker’s cooperativeness (and thus propensity to shirk) is not
directly observable. Firms thus choose whether to enter production with the complex technology
knowing that if they hire a non-cooperator they may su¤er losses. The prevalence of cooperators
in a population will thus a¤ect …rms’ entry decisions. But …rms’ entry decisions will also a¤ect the
prevalence of cooperators (i.e. the population’s culture). Cooperators are relatively good workers
in complex production but not any better in traditional production, which is individualistic.
If …rms do not enter, and thus complex production does not occur, cooperators cannot reap
rewards to their character. If, on the other hand, enough …rms enter, cooperators have a chance
of reaping extra economic rewards. When these rewards are high enough evolutionary forces
favour the emergence of cooperation.
It is this interaction between …rms who are rationally deciding, based on pro…t maximization,
whether to enter production, and workers whose characteristics are a¤ected by these …rms’ choices
through evolutionary forces, that yields the model’s interesting results. There are two sets of
results. Firstly relating to existence, this symbiosis between …rms and culture can lead to two
distinct types of steady state. In the …rst one, there is only traditional production, …rms do not
enter and the population has a low level of cooperativeness. In the second, many individuals
are cooperators. This induces …rms to engage in complex production and evolutionary incentives
support the continued existence of cooperativeness in the population. These steady states can be
welfare ranked with the latter one better than the …rst.
The second set of results show that such a “good” steady state can be sensitive to changes in
the external environment. In particular, evolutionary incentives for the maintenance of coopera-
tiveness depend critically on the relationship between the productivity of the technology available
to …rms and the pervasiveness of cooperativeness. This leads to the paper’s most important re-
sult: improvements in the productivity of …rms’ complex technology that are too rapid (this will
be made formal) can make a society unambiguously worse o¤. In short, if the productivity of
technology rises too quickly and outstrips changes in the population’s culture, not only will the
technology fail in production, but it can set in motion evolutionary forces that will eventually de-
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stroy the population’s existing levels of cooperativeness. Changes that are too rapid will result in
monotonic and unique convergence to the Pareto inferior steady state. However, if technological
improvements are introduced slowly enough so that they allow time for the population’s culture
to keep pace, productivity improvements will always lead to Pareto improvement.
This points to a possible reason for why development was successful in the West but may not
be readily emulated in follower countries. Slow change was a condition imposed on the West by
the fact that new technologies and institutions had to be “home-grown”. This contrasts with
the potential for rapid change which has accompanied the implementation of such “o¤-the-shelf”
Western technologies and institutions in LDCs over the second half of this century.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the model, Section 3 analyses the model,
determining steady states, dynamics and welfare, and Section 4 derives the main results. We
withhold discussion of related literature to Section 5, and there also provide a brief conclusion.
2 The Model
The economy comprises measure 2 of individuals at all times. Measure 1 of individuals is born
in every period and each individual lives for two periods (young and old). There is free entry of
…rms. Each …rm can employ one unskilled worker (a laborer) and one manager. Firms live for one
period only.5 Firms can be ordered according to their entry costs which are denoted Ei for …rm
i; and are drawn from a distribution with density function e(:); which is continuous on support
[E; 1); with E ¸ 0: Firms incur this cost when entering. The number of …rms with entry cost Ê
or lower is given by m
R Ê
E e(x)dx; where m > 1; which means that the total number of potential
…rms is greater than the number of workers. The number of …rms that enter is endogenously
determined and will be denoted as °: Both …rms and individuals are risk neutral and there is no
discounting. If not working, individuals receive utility normalized to zero each period of their
lives, which is also the opportunity cost of entry to a …rm.
All values in the model are expressed in the utility metric.
A worker’s cooperativeness is determined before knowing their ability by nature ( a process
described below), and ability is revealed to a worker before period 1 of life. In period 1, young
workers are unskilled and they either work at a …rm or are unemployed. The output of unskilled
5The model’s steady states are qualitatively unchanged if …rms are allowed to live for an arbitrary number of
periods; this would only require that the cost E is reinterpreted as a periodical …xed cost of operating. They could
even be in…nitely lived, as long as discounting is introduced.
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work in period 1 is observed by all …rms, together with the abilities of all workers.6 In period
2, old individuals are either employed as managers or unemployed, after which they retire. The
sequence of events in each individual’s life is summarized as follows:
Birth Young Old
Nature ability unskilled output and manager
chooses revealed work or ability or
Cooperativeness to worker unemployed observed unemployed
2.1 Cooperativeness
Individuals are either cooperators, type c; or not, type n: Noncooperators are simply the standard
homo-economicus. For them the cost of e¤ort contributed in any job is ±: Cooperators, on the
other hand, actually enjoy being involved in production and performing their tasks properly.




0 for c types
± > 0 for n types.
Cooperativeness is inculcated at an early age (most realistically by parents, but we remain agnostic
about the source) and also imposes a lifetime utility cost, F; on individuals.7
An individual’s own cooperativeness is private information.
2.2 Ability
Ability is entirely exogenous and is revealed to individuals after nature has determined their
cooperativeness, and to all …rms only after the …rst period of an individual’s employment. The
distribution of ability types in the population is binary:
proportion µ are low ability
proportion 1 ¡ µ are high ability.
6 Identical results obtain if ability is non-observable as will become clear.
7This cost can be thought of as the cost of being taught to consider others at an early age (again this is
probably a cost also borne by parents but we will render this internal to the individual). It could also arise if
being a cooperator were costly in other ways, for instance, if other individuals took advantage of cooperators. Our
approach here is to short cut much of the complexity of a realistic account of social evolution by internalizing all of
the costs and bene…ts of a “type” to the individual. In reality, parents bear large costs too. However, the pattern of
evolution will be qualitatively identical provided they make decisions based on some combination of their children’s
and their own welfare. See Bowles (1998) for further discussion and a survey of work on endogenous preferences.
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Ability in‡uences the level of skills a worker accumulates when young. The skill level will, in
turn, determine the worker’s productivity in some tasks when old. The details are spelled out in
section 2.4 below.
2.3 Output of a laborer
As discussed in the introduction, there are bene…ts to shirking which can not be ameliorated
either by contract or by direct supervision. We assume that employers can condition payment
on output, but there is limited liability so that in the event of insu¢cient output, the maximal
penalty is zero payment.
The worker employed as a laborer chooses to either work (contribute e¤ort) or shirk (no
e¤ort). If working, output of value Y is produced. If shirking, output = 0 and the …rm loses z
which the shirking worker obtains herself. If w1 denotes wages paid to laborers, these possibilities
are summarized as follows:
…rm receives worker receives e¤ort cost
worker works Y ¡ w1 w1 0 for c type; ± for n type
worker shirks ¡z z 0 for both types
Shirking is thus an activity like slacking on the job, or using the company’s resources for one’s
own bene…t.8 Even though for c workers e¤ort costs nothing, shirking may still be attractive
since it allows the possibility of obtaining z:9
2.4 Output of a manager
Each …rm needs one worker in a managerial position. The productivity of the manager is inde-
pendent of the …rm’s laborer. Management requires e¤ort and again allows a potential gain to
shirking. E¤ort cost in a managerial position is identical to that incurred in a laborer position,
i.e., 0 for c, and ± for n types. If e¤ort is provided, output depends on the manager’s skills de-
veloped during the previous period. Since the young workers have not had the chance to develop
skills during the previous period, their output if employed as managers is zero, which means they
would never be hired for this position. The skills of an old worker depend on the individual’s
8The critical feature of this environment is that shirking provides some bene…t to the employee and that it
imposes some costs on the …rm, which is ensured by the limited liability assumption. That the workers’ bene…ts
and …rms’ costs of shirking are equivalent, as in the current formulation, is not necessary for the results to follow,
though it does serve to make the model simpler.
9To make the model more general, one could also assume that a cooperator bene…ts from shirking less than a
non-cooperator. A simple way to model this would be to assume that the bene…t from shirking to a cooperator is
®z; where ® 2 (0; 1): This would not change any of our results qualitatively.
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ability. A high ability type produces output valued at H(°) as a manager (recall that ° denotes
the total number of …rms in the economy). The low ability type produces a lower value of output
denoted L, where L · H(°).
If shirking, either type receives a personal gain of " > 0; where " < L; while the cost imposed
on the …rm is an amount k: We assume management is more vital to the …rms than unskilled
labour; formally, we will let k ! 1; to rule out the possibility of …rms with shirking managers ever
being productive. Contracting possibilities are the same as for the young, i.e., output conditioned
wages can be paid but there is limited liability, so that wages are non-negative. This implies that
…rms will avoid hiring a shirking manager at all costs.10 If the manager’s wage is denoted w2 (j) ;
where j = H; L; or 0 denotes the three possible outputs, the possibilities can again be summarized
in a table:
…rm receives worker receives e¤ort cost
high ability manager works H ¡ w2 (H) w2 (H) 0 for c type; ± for n type
low ability manager works L ¡ w2 (L) w2 (L) 0 for c type, ± for n type
manager shirks ¡k " 0 for both types
Productivity of an old individual who was unemployed in the …rst period is zero in any
managerial position. Individuals who do not work as managers when old will be unemployed.
We would like to note here that the model described above is fairly general. For example,
with a little e¤ort, it could be reinterpreted to capture the following setting (used, for example,
in Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997)): The employee (the
manager and/or the laborer) has to exert e¤ort to learn about the payo¤s of an array of available
projects. Based on his private information, the employee then chooses a project which the …rm
will undertake. However, the project that maximizes the …rm’s pro…t may be di¤erent from the
one that yields the greatest private bene…t to the employee. Thus, as in our model, the employee
can harm the …rm, this time by not choosing the optimal, pro…t maximizing, project rather than
by shirking.
10 If we let k be …nite, the only change would be a decrease in the equilibrium number of workers who become
cooperators. The source of k is not explicitly modelled but it is meant to correspond to situations where employers
cannot safeguard against the actions of bad managers and will therefore only produce when they can “trust” them.
We have in mind, in particular, situations where managers have important responsibilities whose timely execution
is vital to the …rm. Some examples are where a manager is responsible for decision making related to production
and input choices, or where there is sensitive equipment that must be maintained and properly used. Once again,




Firms adjust instantaneously according to expected pro…t from entering, but culture does so
slowly. The critical state variables are the proportion (or measure) of individuals that are coop-
erative, ¯; and the measure of …rms that enter, which we denote °.
Assume population types adjust gradually according to a replicator dynamic. The exact form
of the replicator is immaterial for our results – all that matters is that the number of cooperators
increases if cooperativeness is rewarded and that the adjustment is not immediate. Speci…cally,
we assume that the proportion of cooperators, ¯; adjusts according to:
¢¯
¢t
= (1 ¡ ¯) ¯© (E [uc] ¡ E [un]) ; (1)
where the function © is increasing and E[us] denotes the expected lifetime utility of a cooperator
(s = c) or non-cooperator (s = n).11 There are numerous stories which could be evoked to
justify the adjustment of a population’s cooperativeness via a replicator dynamic. One story
would be that parents choose the type of values to inculcate into their children based on the
expected returns of those values. Thus, at a cost, F , parents can make their children “enjoy”
cooperation; when they grow up they will like cooperating, and hence working, more. According
to the dynamic above, parents will be more likely to choose this when it yields bene…ts, since the
extra future returns to being a cooperator must justify the costs incurred. Importantly also, the
replicator implies that when returns change, not all individuals immediately switch. There are,
once again, a number of reasons that could be used to support this assumption: di¤usion e¤ects,
underlying time-varying heterogeneity in adjustment costs or age di¤erences and inertia. We do
not explicitly tie the model to any of these because, as mentioned earlier, the precise form is of
no consequence.12
11Thus, we chose a simple form of replicator, without drift. For a general discussion of equilibrium selection and
analysis with stochastic components see Samuelson (1997).
12One can also interpret such an evolutionary dynamic in a more strictly biological sense, as arising when
those with higher economic rewards are “…tter”, more able to attract mates, and thus more able to leave behind
surviving progeny. We do not favour that interpretation but it is not inconsistent with our model. For more on the
underpinnings evoked to explain a replicator dynamic see Ben Ner and Putterman (1998, Ch. 1). Some readers will
be bothered by the coexistence of fully rational …rms and a replicator dynamic which drives the types of individuals.
We think this modelling is sensible if one believes the choice of attitudes to cooperation is qualitatively di¤erent
to the choice of mode of production to employ in a …rm. We believe the former is much more likely to be subject
to inertia, e.g. from one’s background and the practices of one’s parents, than is the latter, where best practices
should be implemented much more rapidly. The replicator is a reduced form way of modelling this. Other models
that have used both rational decision makers and others driven by evolution are Ho­er (1999) and von Thadden
(1992).
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The adjustment of …rms, in contrast, is immediate; that is, ° is a jump variable. Letting ¼ (t)
denote the expected pro…t (gross of entry costs) of a …rm from hiring a young worker in period
t13, the behaviour of ° (t) is as follows:
if ¼ (t) < E then ° (t) = 0 (2)
if ¼ (t) > E then ° (t) = m
Z Ê
E
e (x) dx and ¼ (t) = Ê: (3)
The conditions above are simply the implications of assuming free and immediate entry on the
part of …rms. Condition (2) says that the measure of …rms entering equals zero when operating
pro…ts are insu¢cient to cover the …xed costs of even the least costly …rm. Condition (3) says
that if operating pro…ts are high enough to cover …xed costs for some …rms, the number of …rms
entering in period t, ° (t) ; will be such that expected operating pro…ts just cover …xed costs of
entry for the marginal …rm.
2.6 Parameter restrictions
We restrict parameters in order to focus on situations where interior equilibria (both c and n
types) have a possibility of existing. These restrictions are considerably more complicated than
the usual Inada conditions, so that we explain each in turn.
Assumption 1: Full employment is feasible in a cooperative population
For E¤ : m
R E¤
E e (x) dx = 1; E
¤ < Y + L ¡ z
This says that if all individuals are cooperators, then full employment is feasible even given
the contracting limitations. The value of output produced when young, Y; plus the increased
productivity a low type obtains due to training, L, net of the bene…t they could obtain due to
shirking, z, exceed the …xed costs of entry even if enough …rms enter to guarantee full employment.
Assumption 2: Diminishing returns to ability
H(:) is concave and decreasing in °, with H (1) = L:
13 It will be seen that hiring old workers as laborers never generates positive pro…t in equilibrium, so we ignore
it without loss of generality here.
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The assumption that H(:) is a decreasing function is meant to capture the fact that the higher
is the number of …rms the more intense is the competition among them.14 The assumption that
H (1) = L ensures that if there is full employment competition is so intense, that any extra
returns due to higher ability managers are completely dissipated.
Assumption 3: Shirking is attractive for some individuals
(i) z > H(0):
(ii) ± > maxfH(0) ¡ "; Y + " ¡ zg:
If the bene…ts of shirking, z; were so low that an individual’s deferred bene…t to being revealed
as a cooperator always exceeded the bene…t of shirking, then shirking would never be a problem.
Part (i) in Assumption 3 guarantees that shirking is attractive enough to make it a problem to
…rms. It also ensures that optimal wages are positive. Part (ii) limits the number of cases that
need to be investigated. It assumes that it is not e¢cient to elicit e¤ort from non-cooperators
either as workers or as managers: By assuming the cost of e¤ort, ±, is high for these types, we
ensure that separation can occur between the c and n types. This is analogous to a single crossing
assumption for this binary production function.
3 Analysis
3.1 Job assignment and wages of old workers
The restrictions placed on the relative costs and bene…ts of e¤ort in each mode of organization,
and the potential for high losses to …rms, ensure …rms will be wary of obtaining the wrong sorts
of agents as managers. That is:
Lemma 1
(i) Workers believed to be cooperators will be assigned to management when old and, in any
competitive equilibrium, will receive wages equal to L or H; depending on their ability.
14Alternatively, we could have assumed that H is decreasing because the higher is the number of …rms, the
less e¢cient is the training process of young workers. For example, the training process may require some scarce
resource common to all …rms using the same technology. Then a high number of …rms using the technology means
that the price of this resource is high, which makes the training process costly and therefore less training is provided
by each …rm. Assumption 2 is stricter than necessary. It is not necessary that H(:) is monotonic, but we will assume
it is in order to simplify the analysis.
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(ii) All the other workers who are not believed with certainty to be cooperators will be unem-
ployed when old.
Proofs of this and all other results are in the appendix.
Workers who are not believed with certainty to be cooperators will never be placed in man-
agement. The reason is that, due to limited liability and large attraction to shirking, it is not
pro…table to elicit e¤ort from these workers. If placed in management they would therefore shirk
and impose large costs on the …rm, k. Firms thus never employ old non-cooperators: The large
cost k also implies they will not risk placing a worker about whose cooperativeness they are unsure
in a management position. Old workers will also never be placed in unskilled jobs because, since
they are in their last period of life, they have no deferred bene…ts to being revealed as cooperators
and, as will become clear subsequently, are thus more costly to motivate than the young.
The wages of managers will be L or H; depending on their ability. The reason is that the
number of these managers is limited and …rms therefore compete for them. Note also that this
would be equivalently the case if ability were not observed, since contracts would simply condition
pay on output produced, subject to the limited liability constraint. Finally, due to competition
between the …rms, whether a …rm employs a high or low ability manager, its pro…t from this
manager is always zero.
3.2 Revelation of cooperativeness
When young, both abilities and types are private information, but a …rm’s output and the identity
of its employee are common knowledge. In some situations, this knowledge may indirectly reveal
information about an employee’s cooperativeness.
Lemma 2 (i) If a young worker produces output of value Y , then it becomes common knowl-
edge that this worker is a cooperator.
(ii) If a young worker produces output of value 0, then with positive probability this worker is
a non-cooperator.
Positive output perfectly reveals a cooperator because at any feasible wages, i.e., w1 · Y;
non-cooperators would always prefer to shirk, even if, by not shirking, they can obtain manage-
ment work for certain: According to Lemma 1, then, non-shirking workers will be assigned to
management: In contrast, output of 0 suggests some uncertainty as to the worker’s cooperative-
ness.
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3.3 Wages of young workers
Firstly note that if ° < 1; a …rm could always set its wage at an arbitrarily low level and still
induce participation. This would, however, not be pro…t maximizing as there would be insu¢cient
incentive for a worker accepting such a wage to provide e¤ort. To calculate the pro…t maximizing
wage it is necessary to compute a …rm’s expected operating pro…t from hiring a young worker
conditional on the wage. This will depend on the distribution of cooperators. Let p denote the
probability that the worker hired by a …rm will not shirk: Then the …rm’s expected pro…t (again,
gross of E) is
¼ = p(Y ¡ w1) ¡ (1 ¡ p)z; (4)
recalling that w1 is the wage paid by the …rm to young non-shirkers under the contract. It will
be seen below that p is a¤ected by w1:
To be viable, a …rm must o¤er a wage attracting at least some cooperators, and inducing them
to work. However, any feasible (i.e., non-negative) wage will always attract non-cooperators too
since these individuals can bene…t by shirking. The pro…t maximizing wage for …rms depends
critically on the underlying ability distribution in the population, and returns to ability when
working as a manager, as follows:
Lemma 3
The pro…t maximizing wage for …rms to pay young workers is
w1 =
½
z ¡ L when H (°) · Ĥ
z ¡ H (°) when H (°) > Ĥ ; (5)
where Ĥ ´ µY +L1¡µ :
Note that the wage setting decision of a …rm is independent of its cost of entry, Ei; since these
costs are sunk: Wages for the young cannot fall to clear the market in this framework, because
they must also induce e¤ort. A …rm o¤ering a positive wage will thus always face an excess
supply of workers if ° < 1: However, there does not exist a wage that can induce e¤ort from the
non-cooperators. This is because such workers would always shirk when put in a management
position and receive ": From Assumption 3 part (ii) this means these individuals are better o¤
shirking even if the …rm were to promise them all of the output they produce when young. Since
cooperativeness is not observable, …rms thus accept that they will, with some probability, hire
a young shirker. They thus design wages to induce no shirking in the event that they happen
13
to hire a worker who is a cooperator. In doing this they face a trade-o¤: if they o¤er the lower
wage, z ¡ H (°) ; only cooperators with high ability will exert the appropriate e¤ort, low ability
cooperators will take the job and shirk. By paying a higher wage, z ¡ L, both high and low
ability cooperators will work (note that part (i) of Assumption 3 immediately implies that all
these wages are positive). Equation (5) describes the determinants of that decision: when returns
to the high ability are relatively large, …rms can induce e¤ort from these individuals much more
cheaply than they can from the low, thus making the low wage strategy more attractive.
3.4 Interior equilibria
We …rst establish the existence of interior equilibria – those in which both c and n types exist
and there is entry of …rms. Since cooperativeness is evolutionarily costly (F > 0), an interior
equilibrium requires the existence of some economic rewards to it. In turn, for this to happen,
some …rms must make a non-negative pro…t net of their entry costs. We …rst discuss necessary
conditions for both of these occurrences before formally describing interior equilibria.
The existence of economic rewards to cooperativeness turns on the wages paid to young
workers. Suppose that the …rms paid the low wage in equation (5), w1 = z ¡ H (°). Then even
high ability individuals would receive no return to being a cooperator, and cooperativeness could
never be part of the population’s culture. To see this, suppose that a high ability individual does
not shirk and is indirectly revealed as a cooperator. This person then receives a payment of H (°)
as a manager when old; however, this only yields for them a combined two period utility of z;
at the wage w1 = z ¡ H (°) ; which is what they could have had as a non-cooperator by simply
shirking when young. A cooperator with low ability would be even worse o¤. Consequently,
evolutionary incentives for cooperation can only exist if …rms pay young workers the high wage,
that is, if w1 = z ¡ L:15 From Lemma 3.3, a necessary and su¢cient condition for this to be the
optimal wage is
H (°) · Ĥ: (6)
15The general point here is that the high ability receive a rent when …rms wish to induce e¤ort from the low
types too. If …rms care only about inducing the high type, they can adjust wages so that the high type receive none
of the rent. This feature corresponds to the ability/informational rents which occur in standard principal agent
models with adverse selection, and is well known to be robust to extension; see Salanie (1997) for a treatment of
this.
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Another necessary feature of an interior equilibrium is that the …rms who allow cooperators
to be indirectly revealed must obtain non-negative pro…ts. At w1 = z ¡ L; it can be seen from
(4) that this implies ¯(Y ¡ z + L) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯) z ¸ E; since p = ¯ as this wage attracts all workers.
Rearranging yields:




If this condition is violated, then even the lowest cost …rms earn negative expected pro…t and
choose not to operate. Note, however, that values of ¯ satisfying the above condition always exist
(i.e., ¯1 < 1) by Assumption 1:
We are now ready to establish necessary and su¢cient conditions for the existence of a unique,
stable, interior steady state.
Proposition 1 (i) If an interior equilibrium (¯¤; °¤) 2 (0; 1) exists, it corresponds to a solution
to the following conditions:
Ê = ¯¤ (Y + L) ¡ z (8)




e (x) dx: (10)
(ii) Holding all other parameters …xed, there exist F ¤ > 0 and Y ¤(F ) ¸ 0 such that:
(a) If F > F ¤ no interior equilibrium exists.
(b) If F = F ¤ and Y ¸ Y ¤(F ) then there exists a unique interior equilibrium (¯¤; °¤) with
0 < ¯¤ < 1; 0 < °¤ < 1. This equilibrium is unstable.
(c) If F < F ¤ and Y ¸ Y ¤(F ) then there exist exactly two interior equilibria, (¯¤A; °¤A) and
(¯¤B; °¤B), with 0 < ¯
¤
i < 1; 0 < °
¤




j ; i; j 2 fA; Bg; i 6= j; then equilibrium
i is stable while equilibrium j is unstable.
The necessity part of the proposition needs little explanation: To observe positive entry of
…rms and both types existing in a steady state requires that (i) marginal …rms are indi¤erent to
entering, and (ii) being a cooperator is equivalent, in expected utility terms to not being one.
Also, condition (6) must hold, and this is re‡ected, through the …rm’s wage setting, in equation
(8) : Su¢ciency is less immediate. The …rst condition, that F cannot be too high, is relatively
straightforward, since for too high values of F; economic rewards can never justify nature’s choice
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of cooperativeness. The existence of two interior steady states for lower values of F , A and B
in Figure 1, follows from counteracting e¤ects of ° on expected returns to cooperativeness. For
increasing °, the probability of being revealed as a cooperator rises, but the relative return to
this happening falls due to H 0 (:) · 0: The second e¤ect eventually dominates so that the higher
° steady state, B in Figure 1, is the stable one. Finally, Y must be su¢ciently high in order for
…rms to be willing to pay the higher wage, w1 = z ¡ L; that induces both the low and the high
ability cooperators to provide e¤ort. The proof of the proposition, in the appendix, demonstrates
that the su¢ciency conditions ensure (7) and (6) hold, so that these do not also need to be
assumed.
The stable steady state B; described in the proposition and depicted in Figure 1, has the
following characteristics: …rms earn positive expected operating pro…ts from hiring unskilled
young workers, some workers are unemployed when young and these ones remain so when old.
All cooperators that obtain employment are employed in the second period of life as managers,
others are unemployed. The movement of individuals is sketched in Table 1:
Table 1: Steady State B
Birth ability probability Young output Old
realized revealed
Cooperator ! °¤B work ! manager
with prob.
¯¤B ! 1 ¡ °¤B unemployed ! unemployed
Non-coop. ! °¤B shirk ! unemployed
with prob.
(1 ¡ ¯¤B) ! 1 ¡ °¤B unemployed ! unemployed
3.5 Corner Equilibria
A corner equilibrium is also possible:
Proposition 2 There exists a stable steady state in which ¯ = 0; ° = 0:
At a corner equilibrium described by Proposition 2, the non-entry of …rms, ° = 0; implies
that cooperators can never be revealed. Consequently evolutionary forces continue to favour non-
cooperators, ¯ = 0; so that then it is not viable for …rms to exist. Note that this is a stable steady
state: the introduction of a small number of cooperators will not induce …rms to enter because,
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since these cooperators cannot credibly communicate their type, any …rms entering would be
inundated with applications from all workers, most of whom are going to shirk.
A steady state at the other corner, ¯ = 1; is not possible. If all workers are employed, then
H(°) ! L by Assumption 2, part (i): Thus being a cooperator yields no net bene…t since the
amount of rent is H(°) ¡ L. In that case, individuals who are non-cooperators and hence do not
incur the evolutionary cost, F; will have higher lifetime utility; ¯ will fall.16
We now compare society’s welfare in the interior steady state with the no cooperator steady
state.
Proposition 3 Social welfare in the interior steady state described in Proposition 1 is strictly
higher than social welfare in the steady state described in Proposition 2.
For existence of the interior steady state, investment in cooperativeness must be socially
e¢cient, that is, F must be relatively low. The considerable e¢ciency gain to having cooperators
thus ensures that even though there is shirking by some of the young in the interior steady state,
infra-marginal …rms make positive expected pro…ts. There is never shirking in management
because …rms are careful only to hire cooperators there: Moreover, individuals are also better o¤,
in expectation, since those with high ability have a possibility of receiving an ability rent in the
interior steady state.
3.6 Dynamics
Consider the dynamics of this system in (¯; °) space in Figure 2 below. Note that the phase
space for the analysis undergoes a fundamental change at the point where conditions (7) and (6)
bind. The line H = bH, given by condition (6), is horizontal since it is una¤ected by ¯; and,
conversely, condition (7) is independent of °: The curve ¢°¢t = 0 comprises three parts: for values
of ° above the line H = bH; …rms pay the high wage, w1 = z ¡ L; so that the curve in this region
is simply given directly from (8) : For values of ° below the line H = bH; …rms pay the low wage,
16Note that our parameter restriction requiring H(1) = L was much stricter than necessary. All our qualitative
results obtain even if H(1) is greater than L; as long as it is not “too large”, i.e., as long as H(1) ¡ L < F:
As H(1) ¡ L increases and approaches F; the stable interior equilibrium of Proposition 4 converges to the corner
equilibrium with ¯ = 1: We concentrate here on parameters allowing for an interior equilibrium because we consider
this equilibrium to be more interesting and realistic, as it implies the simultaneous occurrence of both cooperators
and non-cooperators.
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w1 = z ¡ H (°) ; so that the entry condition for …rms is given by
Ê (°) = ¯ (1 ¡ µ) [Y ¡ z + H (°)] ¡ [1 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ µ) z]; (11)
which is ‡atter than the part of the curve given by (8), since lowering ° also lowers the wage that
needs to be paid through H (°) ; in addition to lowering entry costs through Ê: The third part
of the curve is ‡at and this starts where condition (7) holds at point ¯1: for values of ¯ < ¯1 net
pro…ts in all entering …rms are negative, so none enter.
When both conditions (6) and (7) are satis…ed, the analysis in Proposition 1 applies and
we have the two curves for (9) and one for (8) depicted, which represent ¢¯¢t = 0 and
¢°
¢t = 0
respectively. (Figure 2 depicts only the stable curve for (9)): The steady state B is locally
stable. Furthermore, given that …rms adjust instantaneously, while culture adjusts according to
the replicator dynamic, movement to the steady state from any point in the region involves a
vertical jump to the line ¢°¢t = 0 and then gradual convergence along the arm under the dynamic
in (1), as indicated by the heavy arrows.
At points where either one of conditions (6) or (7) does not hold, non-cooperators always
do better: When (7) fails, there is no …rm entry and thus no possibility of being revealed as a
cooperator, or, if …rms enter, when (6) fails, the reward to being revealed as a cooperator is too
small. In either of these cases (i.e., in the shaded region in Figure 2) ¢¯¢t < 0 and continues so
until ¯ = 0; that is, …nal convergence on the steady state described in Proposition 2, represented
by point C in Figure 2.
4 Productivity improvements
Consider the e¤ect of improvements in either institutions or technology that increase productivity
but that tend to be ability intensive. The simplest way of modelling this is as a change which
increases the average productivity of those who are skilled, while leaving una¤ected the produc-
tivity of the unskilled. Amongst the skilled, consider an improvement that increases returns to
the H types more than those of the L types. A number of changes seem to correspond with this:
implementation of new technologies or work practices, changes in institutions (for example priva-
tization, or allowing more competition in the labour market), or perhaps opening up to trade.17
17The exact reason is immaterial to the analysis, and all qualitative results are unchanged provided, for any
changes, returns to the high types increase relatively more than returns to the low. We discuss the implications of
our model for non-ability intensive development subsequently.
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Since the crucial assumption here is the ability intensity of this productivity improvement, we
model these changes by assuming that returns to the H types rise while returns to the L types are
…xed. Since H (:) is a function we do this by de…ning a new function corresponding to an upward
shift in the previous one. Formally, we now de…ne H to be also a function of a parameter q;
H (q; °), with Hq (q; °) > 0 for all ° < 1 and Hq (q; 1) = 0 (the latter constraint serves to preserve
Assumption 2).18 Thus, an increase in productivity is denoted by an increase in parameter q:
4.1 E¤ects of a productivity increase on welfare
Consider now two di¤erent productivity parameters ql and qh; and let qh > ql so that the economy
with qh has more productive managers. Figure 3 sketches the change arising from a higher q and
corresponding increase in H. First consider equation (9). The left hand side is una¤ected by
the change but the right hand side increases in value, so that the stable steady state °B is
higher. Thus the curve °¤B; de…ned by (9), shifts up. In the …gure, all curves drawn with solid
lines correspond to values under ql; whereas dashed lines are those under qh: (Note that there
is a simultaneous decrease in °A, but this is immaterial to the analysis and is not depicted.)
The curve H (qh; °) = bH also rises above H (ql; °) = bH: This upward shift arises because bH is
independent of q: Hence, an increase in H(q; °) due to a higher q must be counter-balanced by a
higher °, since dHd° < 0. A …nal shift is in a segment of
¢°
¢t = 0; de…ned by (8) : Note …rstly that
this curve does not change for values of ° above those at which H (qh; °) = bH: This is because,
at these values, …rms choose the high wage strategy, w1 = z ¡ L; so that the change in H does
not a¤ect them. However, at lower values of °; …rms optimally choose the low wage strategy,
w1 = z ¡ H; which has become more pro…table with an increase in H: Therefore, in order to
preserve the zero expected pro…t condition at the entry margin, ° must increase, as depicted by
the arced arrow, denoting an upward movement in the part of the curve below H (qh; °) = bH:
By inspection of Figure 3, it can be seen that, in the new steady state (°¤D; ¯
¤
D), both ° and
¯ are higher. Intuitively, this is because higher expected productivity implies higher rewards
for those revealed to be cooperators. Consequently, evolutionary forces drive more individuals
towards cooperation, and ¯ rises. Moreover, since the population has a better culture of cooper-
ation, more …rms are willing to enter. This new steady state, denoted by D in Figure 3, is also
locally stable. Finally, it is also the case that ¯1 falls; but since this plays no role in the analysis,
18Hq(:; :) denotes the derivative of H(:; :) with respect to q:
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we consider it no further.
The following proposition characterizes the e¤ect of this productivity increase on social wel-
fare.
Proposition 4 Let qh > ql: If q increases from ql to qh and the economy moves from the stable
steady state corresponding to ql to the stable steady state corresponding to qh; social welfare in
the economy increases.
Such a productivity improvement thus seems unambiguously good. By raising returns to
ability, it raises the expected value of cooperativeness. In turn, with more cooperators in the
population, …rms respond by entering, which reinforces the population’s improved cooperative-
ness, ¯ rises. Firms’ pro…ts rise because, on average, fewer workers shirk. Workers are better o¤
because more can reap the bene…ts of cooperativeness.
However, the issue of transition from the low productivity interior steady state to the higher
one, i.e., moving from B to D in Figure 3, has not yet been addressed.
4.2 Productivity improvements may fail
Economies do not instantaneously jump between steady states. Firms are relatively ‡uid and
can enter quickly to re‡ect the new opportunities. However, the culture adjusts more slowly,
a feature we have captured by using a replicator dynamic. In terms of the model’s dynamics,
this means that the model always converges along (8) as discussed in the previous section. This
sluggishness in culture’s adjustment renders the …nal outcome far from clear. In fact, as the
following proposition shows, even though productivity improvements make a better steady state
possible, such a steady state will not always be attainable.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the economy starts in a stable interior equilibrium (¯¤B; °¤B) cor-
responding to ql: Consider an increase in the productivity parameter to qh > ql; while all other
parameters remain …xed. There exists a 4 > 0 such that if H(qh; °¤B) ¡ H(ql; °¤B) > 4, the
economy converges monotonically to a steady state in which: (1) all cooperativeness is destroyed,
i.e. ¯ = 0; (2) all …rms shut down, and (3) no workers are employed.
The proposition says that if the e¤ects of attempted productivity improvement, represented
by ¢, are too large, it may not be possible to achieve the more e¢cient interior steady state, D
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in Figure 3; instead, the economy converges to an inferior corner equilibrium in which initially
existing cooperativeness is destroyed; as depicted by point C in Figure 3.
Figure 4 represents the dynamics of this situation graphically (the dashed horizontal lines
correspond to qh; and solid lines to ql). As depicted, the rise in productivity has moved the line
H (q; °) = bH above the original equilibrium value of °; denoted °¤B: This is the condition for the
transition to fail. With ¯ starting at point ¯¤B; the marginal …rms at the old level of ° strictly
prefer to enter, re‡ecting the higher productivity of H; and they do so up until the point denoted
°1 in the …gure. This is the upward arrow from point B in Figure 4. But as the point (°1; ¯
¤
B) is
below H (qh; °) = bH; all …rms now strictly prefer the low wage strategy.
Intuitively, since the productivity enhancement improves productivity and rewards the high
ability relatively more this increases the rent of high ability individuals, ceteris paribus. It now
becomes optimal for …rms to target these individuals when setting wages. An implication of this
is that not even high ability workers can receive ability rents and evolutionary incentives force a
decline in cooperativeness. In the next period then, the economy has even fewer cooperators (¯
falls), which leads to a decrease in °; so that the economy traverses along the arm of ¢°¢t (qh) = 0
in the South-West direction in Figure 4: This arm then monotonically converges to the non-
cooperative steady state, point C. Note that this would not have happened if ¯ could somehow
increase directly to its new interior steady state level, ¯¤D; depicted at point D: This is because,
at point D; ¯ is high enough for the relative di¤erence between the low and high ability’s returns
to be small, so that …rms choose to continue with the high wage strategy.
On the other hand, productivity improvements which are not ability intensive will surely
succeed. If L were to increase by more than H; …rms would have even stronger incentives to
pay the high wage, and evolutionary incentives would persist in transition to the better steady
state.19
In summary, although the productivity improvements create the possibility of a better equi-
librium, it may be that this better equilibrium cannot be reached starting from the economy’s old
equilibrium. Moreover, not only can the new one not be reached, but the favourable characteris-
tics of the old equilibrium: some …rms entering, some cooperators existing, and some managers
being trained, may also be lost. In such a case, the economy converges uniquely to the bad corner
19 In terms of …gure 3, the dashed curve H = bH; shifts downward instead of up, so that transition to the new




Suppose now the productivity changes occur gradually. This more closely corresponds to the
emergence of technologies and institutions in the West.20 Here we model this as corresponding
to a number of convex combinations of the dramatic increase in the productivity parameter q
considered previously. Gradual development is a sequence of K technology or organizational
changes, K > 1; such that in change k; k = 1; 2; :::; K; the productivity parameter q increases
from qk¡1 to qk, where q0 = ql and qK = qh: Suppose also that after each of these steps is
implemented the economy is given enough time to converge to the new steady state before the
next step is undertaken. This will be referred to as a gradualization K of development. The next
proposition shows that properly sequenced changes allow the undesirable outcome of Proposition
5 to be avoided:
Proposition 6 Suppose that the economy starts in a stable interior equilibrium (¯¤B; °¤B) corre-
sponding to ql: Consider an e¢ciency enhancing change that increases the productivity parameter
to qh > ql: There exists a gradualization K of this change that ensures a unique path of develop-
ment that converges on the superior interior equilibrium.
Intuitively, implementing a series of small changes allows the population’s culture to keep
pace with the development process. Evolutionary incentives to maintain cooperativeness depend
on wages paid by …rms that encourage cooperators, which in turn depend on the magnitude of
rents enjoyed by high ability cooperators. Gradualization of development ensures these rents do
not become so high as to tempt …rms to lower their wages, which would destroy any evolutionary
incentives to become a cooperator.
Gradualization of development is not the only way to ensure convergence to the development
steady state. In general, dramatic changes can still be implemented provided the dispersion in
returns to the H and L types is limited. If earned income is observable and taxable, increased
dispersion can be o¤set by increasing progressivity in the tax and transfer system: Firms will
20Dramatic change did occur there too, but even large technological innovations are not likely to have presented
as profound a change as the introduction of centuries of accumulated know-how in the largely agrarian economies
of contemporary LDCs.
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persist with the high wage strategy, which preserves evolutionary incentives for cooperativeness,
causing development to succeed.
While we concede that our model is too stylized to generate unconditional policy recommen-
dations, it is noteworthy that the prominent development success stories of the Asia Paci…c all
started with tightly compressed earnings distributions, comparable to OECD and high income
countries, that remained stable over the periods of high per capita income growth (in the range
of 5% for the region as a whole) from the early 60s to the 90s. Comparison with the world’s
low growth regions over the same period, Latin America (approximately 1.5% per capita income
growth), and Sub-Saharan Africa, (less than 1% per capita income growth) are consistent with
the model.21 Both of these regions had signi…cantly more dispersed income distributions than
the Asia Paci…c (Gini coe¢cients in the 50’s and 40’s respectively, compared with the mid 30’s
for the Asia Paci…c; see Deininger and Squire (1998)), and grew much more slowly. This negative
impact of inequality on growth is already well known and has spawned a considerable literature
to explain it. Our model provides another reason to expect such a link and further relates it to
the population’s culture.
On the cultural perspective, the extent of the locus of “trust” and how far this extends beyond
the family is an old topic in the development studies literature. This is linked to attitudes about
cooperation and compromise and argued to be a successful ingredient of enterprises’ e¤ective
organization. Foster (1967) summarizes outcomes of these early surveys that attempt to elicit
measures of trust.22 The basic …nding is that in most poor countries the radius of identi…cation
and trust is con…ned to the family, outside the family is an object of indi¤erence and even hostility.
Anthropologists have noted the similarity of such value attitudes in peasant societies around the
world which have been described as a zero sum world view - one individual’s gain comes only
at the expense of another. A widely cited early case study is by Ban…eld (1958) of an Italian
peasant village, which has been repeated in numerous countries.23 This body of work has an
obvious parallel with the present paper. Trust will tend to be high when a large proportion of
the population are cooperators, as we have de…ned them. The point of our model, however, is to
argue that this should not be treated as an exogenous feature of the society’s environment but
21The precise …gures vary depending on precise start and end dates and the countries de…ned in a region, but
are always close to these approximations.
22Jones (1997) provides a more recent survey of this psychometric literature.
23Many of these studies are discussed in Potter, Diaz and Foster (1967).
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that it too depends on that environment.
5 Discussion and conclusions
In this section we discuss some of our crucial modeling assumptions and the robustness of our
results to relaxing these assumptions. We also relate our model to existing literature. Finally, we
o¤er some concluding remarks.
5.1 Robustness
We believe that much of the model’s structure could be generalized while preserving the main
results. We have not attempted this since our aim has not been to provide the most general
treatment, nor the most realistic model of LDC labour markets, but rather to construct as simple
a framework as possible to examine the critical forces at play in our argument. Here we discuss
these.
The inability of …rms to fully control all elements of the production relationship, either by
a complete contract or supervision, ensured cooperativeness could have a socially bene…cial role
in our model. The precise way we modelled this was by assuming that contracts were limited
to specifying non-negative payments for workers, i.e. limited worker liability. This ensured that
shirking was costly to the …rm, since it was not able to recoup all losses via a penalty payment from
workers. Under the accompanying assumption that such shirking was bene…cial to workers (the
term z) this meant …rms were concerned about the possibility of shirking, and cooperativeness
could play a role. Thus, workers’ shirking being costly to …rms is clearly a crucial ingredient of
our model. However, that this arises through limited worker liability is not.
Another crucial ingredient was the existence of di¤ering ability types in the population. This
ensured that when …rms found it optimal to provide performance incentives for those with low
ability, the high type received an informational rent that was critical in maintaining evolutionary
incentives for development of cooperativeness. This basic e¤ect would persist in a model with
more than two types, and where …rms were not able to extract all of the rents of unskilled workers.
In such a world, the rents enjoyed by high ability types would fall as some of the lower ability
types were ignored by …rms, but perhaps not disappear altogether. As long as they fell, the same
dilution of evolutionary incentives for cooperativeness as considered in the paper would occur,
but would simply be less stark.
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We couched our analysis of cooperativeness in an explicitly evolutionary environment because
we believe that framework provides a realistic framework for thinking about cultural variables.
However, evolutionary environments are often criticized for their lack of individual rationality,
a feature which is also evident here when the economy is transitioning to a steady state. It
should be noted, however, that the evolutionary framework is not strictly necessary for our main
results. The critical factor is that, at the aggregate level, changes in cooperativeness should occur
slowly (relative to …rms’ entry decisions and technology choices). This is, of course, a feature of
replicator based evolutionary models, but not exclusively so. A non-evolutionary based reason for
such slow changes in aggregate could be, for example, randomly realized heterogeneous costs of
individual adjustment, or variations due to di¤erences in age. Provided this feature of di¤erences
in speed of adjustment is preserved, the main concerns raised in this paper will still arise, since,
once again, economies will not be able to instantly jump to the better steady state.
5.2 Related literature
Fershtman and Weiss (1998) are also concerned with the evolution of a potentially valuable
cultural trait. However, in their framework, the trait is observable. Thus there is no possibility
for considering the feature we analyze which is the role played by …rms in facilitating this trait.
Thus the two way interaction between cultural factors and economic which is the aim of our paper
is something that cannot be studied in their framework.
A related paper on “managerial ethics” was due to Noe and Rebello (1994). There, ethical
managers could be trusted to apply appropriate e¤ort even when …nancial incentives were not
su¢ciently strong to mitigate agency problems. They also similarly considered how production
choices varied with aggregate ethic levels, and, in turn, how ethic levels a¤ected returns to previous
levels of ethics. They modelled choices of managerial ethics in a richer way than we have here
by explicitly considering the e¤ects of parental socialization; considerations that we have buried
in our replicator dynamic. A principal di¤erence in their framework is that, like Fershtman and
Weiss, there are no …rms (or any other such similar mechanism) which allow ethics to be revealed.
Thus, in their model, ethical agents can never obtain an economic reward to this characteristic
and are, at best, just as well o¤ as the non-ethical. The reason ethical types can still stabilize at
non-zero levels in their model is that both ethical and unethical parents have positive chances of
producing ethical o¤spring, even though these su¤er lifetime losses. Di¤erent parameterizations
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of transition functions thus lead to either stable managerial ethical levels or cyclical ones, which
they used to explain their main focus, i.e., the dependence of economic activity on ethics levels.
Our focus is instead on the dynamics of adjustment to positive shocks, where this type of positive
shock is an increase in productivity that is ability intensive.
Though structurally much more di¤erent, the model bears a closer conceptual resemblance
to Cozzi (1998). He similarly deals with the inappropriability of returns to a characteristic that
is productivity enhancing, which he also called “culture”. In his model, culture is a costly to
acquire trait that is useful in production and is transmitted from the old to the young by explicit
learning. This broad de…nition of the word culture can be interpreted as being consistent with our
de…nition of culture here. He showed that, even without a direct reward to culture in production,
it could persist in steady state if people will pay to acquire it in anticipation of payment for
training the next generation when they themselves become old. Culture can thus persist as an
asset whose value is positive as part of a rational bubble. Here, in contrast, with enough …rms
entering, cooperative individuals can bene…t directly from their cultural trait. Unlike Cozzi we do
not allow for individuals to bene…t by selling this skill to future generations so that the returns to
cooperativeness depend exclusively on the possibility of an informational rent to the high ability
that is obtained when …rms want to induce e¤ort from the low ability too. This is what causes
the potentially negative impact of productivity enhancing changes, since these can lead …rms to
give up on inducing e¤ort from the low ability altogether.
A …nal relationship is to the large literature on culture, or norms, as a description of the
equilibrium behaviour of agents that maintain reciprocity by within group sanctioning and pun-
ishment. This work focuses on community based cooperation, as in Ostrom (1990), that arises
due to repeated interaction and reputations. A formal analysis in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma
context is undertaken by Greif (1994). He shows that when group sanctioning is strong enough
cooperation can be sustained even if all agents are of the same type. Thus, there is no need
to posit a cultural tendency to cooperativeness, as we have done here, since with good enough
communal enforcement even homo-economicus will not shirk. This suggests that where culture
might be of more importance is precisely in those situations where there is no longer the possi-
bility of traditional group enforcement. That is, where economies are attempting a transition to
more large scale and hence anonymous and complex forms of production. We believe this to be
a closer parallel to the process of development or modernization today than a framework where
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enforcement is sustained by group punishment.
One interpretation of the paper’s main result is as providing a reason for why the plight of
currently developing countries may be di¤erent from that of Western countries at their own early
stages of development. In the West, continued productivity growth, occurring gradually over
a number of centuries, encouraged development of the right cultural characteristics. However,
follower countries that are attempting to develop by the implementation of e¢ciency enhancing
Western type technologies or institutions, are attempting a much more dramatic change which,
as the model shows, may not succeed even where gradual ones would. However, even dramatic
changes may succeed if they do not lead to too large an increase in relative returns of those who
are already relatively highly rewarded. Thus, a development process in which relative returns of
the high ability do not dramatically outstrip the low is more likely to be a success.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: (ii) Suppose a …rm decides to assign to management a worker whom it
believes is a cooperator with probability less than 1. The …rm would never do this unless it
provides this manager with incentives not to shirk. That is, it must o¤er a wage w2(H) for high
output such that w2(H) ¸ " + ± (otherwise the worker will shirk if he is a non-cooperator). But,
Assumption 3, part (ii), implies that " + ± > H(°) for any °: Hence, in this case w2(H) > H(°);
which means that the …rm earns negative expected pro…t. It will therefore never assign to
management a worker about whom it is unsure.
(i) Now suppose a worker is believed with probability one to be a cooperator. Then she will
provide e¤ort when assigned to management as long as w2(H) ¸ ": Since " < L; this can be
easily satis…ed. In a steady state, the number of …rms at time t; °t; is greater than the number
of managers (who only come from workers who are cooperators), °t¡1¯t¡1; because °t¡1 = °t
and ¯t¡1 is less than one, as will be shown in the proof of Proposition 4. Competition for these
workers will then lead the …rms to bid their wages up to L and H; depending on the ability.¥
Proof of Lemma 2: (i) Consider a non-cooperator employed in a …rm. Suppose the wage
this …rm pays is w
0
1: Then if this individual provides e¤ort, her lifetime utility is w
0
1¡±+"; because
when old she will be assigned to management and then shirk (this follows from the argument in
the proof of part (ii) in Lemma 1 above). If she shirks, in contrast, her payo¤ is z: Thus, the
worker will provide e¤ort only if w
0
1 ¸ ± + z ¡ "; which from part (ii) in Assumption 3 implies
w
0
1 > Y: The …rm will therefore never o¤er this wage, which means that a non-cooperative worker
will always shirk when employed.
Part (ii) is immediate.¥
Proof of Lemma 3: According to the proof of Lemma 2, a …rm will never want to elicit e¤ort
from a young non-cooperator. The wage w1 is therefore determined so as to provide incentives to
cooperators. The lifetime utility of a high ability cooperator who does not shirk is w1 + H (°) ;
since the worker receives payments w1 and then H (°) as a manager (Lemma 2): If this worker
shirks, he receives z only, so that a wage of w1 = z ¡ H (°) just induces an H cooperator not to
shirk. Correspondingly a higher wage of w1 = z ¡ L induces both the high and the low ability
cooperator not to shirk. The non-cooperators, who are proportion (1 ¡ ¯) of the labor force, will
always take a job and shirk. Thus the expected pro…t from the high wage strategy exceeds that
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from the low if and only if:
¯(Y ¡ z + L) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯) z ¸ ¯ (1 ¡ µ) (Y ¡ z + H (°)) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ µ)) z:
This rearranges to the condition in the lemma.¥
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) We …rst show that if an interior equilibrium exists, it solves
conditions (8) to (10). In an interior equilibrium, the expected utility of both cooperators and
non-cooperators must be equal, and …rms hiring the young must make non-negative pro…t at
the equilibrium values of ¯ and °: If not, then either ¯ or ° (or both) will change from their
conjectured equilibrium values.
Both cooperators and non-cooperators strictly prefer to obtain work when young. The non-
cooperators because they can cheat and obtain the positive amount z without e¤ort, and the
cooperators because by working at one of these …rms and not shirking they obtain w1; are revealed
to be a cooperator, and receive payment w2 2 fL; Hg as a manager which is commensurate with
their abilities. If an equilibrium has ° …rms hiring, the probability of an individual receiving
one of these jobs when young is ° < 1, because these jobs are assumed to be rationed randomly.
Reciprocally, measure 1 ¡ ° of the young who do not obtain work are unemployed.
The dynamic governing an individual’s cooperativeness conditions on expected ability, the µ
distribution: In an interior equilibrium, condition (6) must hold (otherwise the wage would equal
z ¡ H (°) and any cooperator would do strictly worse than a non-cooperator, so that ¯ would
converge to zero). Thus, a cooperator has expected utility ¡F + °[(1 ¡ µ)(H (°) ¡ L) + z] +
(1 ¡ °) (0): For a non-cooperator expected utility is (1 ¡ °) (0) + °z; since this individual will
shirk: Combining these yields a condition that is necessary for a positive proportion of each type
in steady state:
°z = ¡F + °[(1 ¡ µ)(H (°) ¡ L) + z]: (12)
Rearranging, we obtain condition (9) in the proposition.
Next consider the pro…t of a …rm j. Given a measure of cooperators, ¯; the expected pro…t
of this …rm is ¼j = ¯(Y ¡ w1) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯) z; which from Lemma 3.3 implies that ¼j = ¯(Y + L) ¡ z
if condition (6) holds. This …rm thus enters as long as
Ej · Ê ´ ¯(Y + L) ¡ z; (13)
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which is condition (10) in the proposition. For simplicity we can denote the function Ê (°) as the
value of Ê corresponding to a particular value of ° in the distribution. Clearly, this function is
increasing.
(ii) Figure 1 plots equations (8) and (9) in (¯; °) space. Consider equation (9) …rst.
Step 1. Existence of a solution to equation (9) :
Both the right hand side (RHS) and the left hand side (LHS) of this equation are plotted
in Figure 1. It is easy to check that Assumption 2 implies that RHS is concave in °. At the
same time, when ° = 0 RHS is equal to zero and increasing in °; where the latter follows from
H(0) > 1. Finally, when ° = 1 then RHS < 0; which follows from H (1) = L (Assumption 2).
Thus, there exists a °̂ 2 (0; 1) such that RHS increases in ° if ° < °̂, decreases if ° > °̂ and
reaches a maximum when ° = °̂; while RHS(°̂) > 0:
Therefore, if F > F ¤ ´ RHS(°̂) then (9) has no solution and claim (a) follows. If F = F ¤
then (9) has exactly one solution, ° = °̂ 2 (0; 1): If F < F ¤ then (9) has exactly two solutions,
°A and °B; both from (0; 1); this case is depicted in Figure 1. Note that (9), and therefore also °̂;
°A and °B; are independent of ¯; so that °A and °B are represented as horizontal lines in Figure
1.
Step 2. Existence of an interior solution to the system of equations (9) and (8). Suppose
F < F ¤ (when F = F ¤ the proof is similar). From Step 1 above we know that (8) has exactly
two solutions °A and °B that are between 0 and 1: Now look at equation (8) : Solving for ¯ we







where the inequality follows since Ê(:) is an increasing function. Thus the function ¯(°) is upward
sloping, as depicted in Figure 1: Because ¯(°) is always between 0 and 1 (from Assumption 1,
parts (ii) and (iii)), there exist ¯A and ¯B from (0; 1) such that ¯A = ¯(°A) and ¯B = ¯(°B):
By monotonicity, ¯A and ¯B are unique and (8) and (9) have exactly two interior solutions.
Step 3. ¯A and ¯B obtained in the previous step satisfy conditions (6) and (7) : Condition (6)
holds for any °̂ that satis…es (9) if Y ¤(F ) is chosen so that H(°̂) · µY ¤(F )+L1¡µ : Y ¤(:) is a function
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of F because °̂ is a function of F: Then (9) holds for any Y ¸ Y ¤(F ): To see that (7) holds note
that ¯i =
E(°i)+z
Y +L ¸ E+zY +L = ¯1, for i = A or B:
Step 4. Stability. Suppose …rst that F < F ¤ and let ¯¤A < ¯
¤
B (this can be assumed without
loss of generality). By comparing expected utilities of cooperators and non-cooperators we …nd
that the expected utility of a cooperator is higher if and only if
F < ° (1 ¡ µ) [H (°) ¡ L]: (14)
Because of the concavity of the RHS (14), this holds if and only if ° 2 (°¤A; °¤B): Thus, if ° 2
(°¤A; °
¤
B) the number of cooperators, ¯; tends to increase, otherwise it tends to decrease.
Similarly, the number of …rms entering; °; rises i¤ the expected pro…t of the (initially) marginal
…rm is larger than the entry cost:
Ê (°) < ¯ (Y + L) ¡ z: (15)
This is true i¤ ¯ > ¯(°):
Consider equilibrium A and suppose that ° increases slightly above °¤A: Then (14) holds,
which implies that ¯ increases, which in turn implies the inequality in condition (15) holds; so
that ° rises further, and so on. Equilibrium A is therefore unstable.
Now consider equilibrium B: Suppose ° increases slightly above °¤B: Then the opposite of (14)
holds and ¯ tends to decrease below ¯¤B. But this means that the opposite of (15) holds so that
° decreases back to °¤B: The opposite happens when we consider a slight decrease of ° below °
¤
B:
Similarly, if ¯ deviates below ¯¤B; the opposite of (15) holds so that ° starts decreasing below °¤B;
which in turn implies that (14) holds and ¯ rises back towards ¯¤B: The opposite happens when
¯ deviates slightly above ¯¤B:
The instability of the unique equilibrium of part (b) follows immediately from the fact that
the reverse of (14) holds for all ° 6= °¤ = °̂; so that ¯ has a tendency to decrease whenever
¯ 6= ¯¤.¥
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose no individuals are cooperators, ¯ = 0. Then the pro…ts
from entry are strictly negative for all …rms, from (4). Thus, from (2) ° = 0. Furthermore, since
there are no …rms, no young workers are revealed as cooperators and consequently net returns to
cooperativeness are strictly negative, so that evolutionary forces drive ¯ to 0. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 3: Compare …rms’ expected pro…ts in each steady state. In the
corner steady state, …rms do not exist. In the interior steady state, infra-marginal …rms earn
positive expected pro…ts: Now consider individuals. In the corner steady state, all individuals
have expected utility equal to zero. In the interior steady state cooperators have equal expected
utility to non-cooperators, that is: E [uc] = E [un] : Thus, consider the expected utility of non-
cooperators. Since, such individuals have a positive probability of obtaining work, where they
will shirk and obtain z, their expected utility is °z > 0: Thus these individuals are strictly better
o¤ in the interior steady state, as are, in expectation, cooperators. Thus economy wide welfare
is higher in the interior steady state.¥
Proof of Proposition 4: Look at the expected utility of workers in steady state, W (q); in
the economy for a given q:
W (q) = ¯°[w1 + µL + (1 ¡ µ)H(q; °) ¡ F ] + (1 ¡ ¯) [°z]:
The …rst term re‡ects the fact that only cooperators work when young and employed. These
individuals are then revealed as cooperators and are assigned to management where their output
depends on their ability. The last term captures the fact that non-cooperators take a job and
shirk. Now consider two values for q; ql < qh; and their corresponding steady states, denoted with
l and h subscripts respectively. In these it is the case that ¯h > ¯l and °h > °l: In any steady
state, by evolutionary pressures it must be the case that the two terms in square brackets in
W (qh) are equalized. But since °h > °l then W (qh) > W (ql) : So workers have higher expected
utility in steady state with higher q: Firms have higher expected pro…ts as a whole since °h > °l
implies that there are more infra-marginal …rms earning positive pro…t. Moreover, each …rm with
Ej < Ê(°B) earns higher pro…t in the steady state corresponding to qh because ¼j = ¯(Y +L)¡z
and ¯h > ¯l: ¥
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider an initial interior steady state (¯¤B; °¤B) corresponding to
the productivity parameter ql: At this steady state, condition (6) must hold, i.e. H(ql; °¤B) · Ĥ:
Let4 = Ĥ¡H(ql; °¤B) and consider a market reform that shifts the productivity fromH(ql; °¤B) to
H(qh; °
¤
B) > H(ql; °
¤
B)+4: Since condition (8), determining equilibrium levels of °; is independent
of H provided (6) continues to hold, the number of …rms, °; does not react to this productivity
increase immediately; rather, it adjusts slowly with ¯; which follows a gradual replicator dynamic.
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Therefore, the economy moves away from the initial equilibrium B slowly and continuously.
Meanwhile, a sudden increase in H by H(qh; °¤) ¡ H(ql; °¤) > 4 causes a discrete jump in
H(:; °¤B); to H(qh; °
¤
B); so that
Ĥ ¡ H(qh; °¤B) < Ĥ ¡ H(ql; °¤B) ¡ 4 = 0;
where the inequality follows from H(qh; °¤B) > H(ql; °
¤
B) + 4: This obviously violates condition
(6) : The number of cooperators therefore gradually starts to decrease and the economy mono-
tonically converges to the ¯ = 0 steady state as described in the dynamics section above:¥




be the stable interior equilibrium corresponding
to tk¡1; k = 1; 2; :::; K: De…ne 4(qk¡1) as 4(qk¡1) ´ Ĥ ¡ H(qk¡1; °¤k¡1) and choose the grad-
ualization 1; 2; :::; K so that H(qk; °¤k¡1) < H(qk¡1; °
¤
k¡1) + 4(qk¡1): By continuity of H(:; :);
it is always possible to …nd a …nite K such that this holds for all k · K: In each of these K
the increase in q causes …rst a discrete jump in H(:; :) from H(qk¡1; °¤k¡1) to H(qk; °
¤
k¡1) and
then a gradual decrease from H(qk; °¤k¡1) to H(qk; °
¤
k) as ° slowly increases with ¯: Moreover,
H(qk; °
¤
k) < H(qk¡1; °
¤




k¡1: Thus, a tran-




to an interior stable steady state (¯¤k; °¤k)





¤ adjusts slowly. But it
holds because
Ĥ ¡ H(qk; °¤k) > Ĥ ¡ H(qk; °¤k¡1) > Ĥ ¡ H(qk¡1; °¤k¡1) ¡ 4(qk¡1) = 0;
where the …rst inequality follows from °¤k > °
¤
k¡1 and the second inequality follows fromH(qk; °
¤
k¡1) <
H(qk¡1; °¤k¡1) + 4(qk¡1):
Thus, if enough time is allowed for ¯ to adjust in every step, condition (6) can remain satis…ed,
and the economy can gradually move from the interior stable steady state corresponding to ql to
the interior stable steady state corresponding to qh. ¥
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